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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of freewill. II. Of those who deny freewill; To what causes they must of necessity…
Many are of opinion, that there is nothing at all in our power; and therefore the discourse of freewill; namely of that which is in our power, doth first occasion this question; Whether any thing be in our power or no: Then a second question, to wit, What those things bee which are in our power; or wherein freewill consisteth: and thirdly, it gives occasion to inquire, Why God our maker, made us with freewill.
That we may discourse orderly of these things, we will speake first to the first question; and prove that there is something in our power, even by the confessions of those who have denied the same.
IIThey affirme, that of things which are made or done, either GOD, or necessity, or destiny, or nature, or fortune, or chance is the cause.
But the proper worke of GOD, is either substance or Providence. The work of necessity is in the motion of those things which are alwayes of one sort. The worke of destiny, is in those things which are to be perfected by it of necessity; for in it, things are effected of necessity. The workes of nature are generation, augmentation, corruption, plants, and living-creatures. The worke of fortune is in things that are very rare, and unexpected.
For they define fortune to be the concurrence, and meeting of two causes, which had their beginning from our will and choice, and yet produce in the end somewhat else then was intended by the thing done. As when hee that is digging of a ditch, findes treasure: For neither hee who there laid the treasure, had any purpose it should be so found; neither had the finder any intent to dig for treasure; but the purpose of the one was to take it thence when he himself thought fit; and the intention of the other was to make a ditch; and there fell out another thing beside those which were purposed by them.
The workes of chance are such as befall unreasonable, and inanimate creatures, without nature, or art.
Now if a man bee neither the cause, nor beginning of his owne actions, under which of these may we containe the things which are done by him?
It is not lawfull, nor comely to ascribe unto GOD those actions of men which are uncleane, or unjust. Neither may we ascribe them to necessity; because they cannot be truly accounted among those things which continue alwayes after one maner. Nor may wee impute them to nature; for the workes of nature, are living-creatures and plants. Nor to fortune, for the actions of men are not rare or unlooked for. Nor belong they to chance; because things casuall belong to inanimate and irrationall creatures.
Therefore it remaineth undeniable, that the man himself which worketh, & accōplisheth such, or such things, is the beginner of his owne actions, and hath freewill.
IIIMoreover, if man bee the beginner of no action of his owne, all consultation is superfluous in him; for to what end is deliberation, if hee have no action in his owne power? But it must needs be a very absurd thing to affirme that to bee superflous in man, which is best, and most honourable in him.
If then he doe consult, he consults about the doing of some thing; for all deliberation doth concerne the execution of some action.
Moreover, of whatsoever things the faculty of doing the same, is in our power; the acting also of those things, and the exercising of that faculty is in our power. But, a faculty to worke according to the vertues, is in our power; therefore the vertues also, are in our power.
Now that the faculties to worke according to vertue are in our power, it is very elegantly declared by Aristotle where he treateth of the morall vertues. That saith he; which wee learne by practise, we practise when wee have learned it: For while we learn to master our pleasures, we become temperate; and when we are temperate, we become the masters of our pleasures.
Wee may argue also in this maner: It is confessed of all, that practise and the exercise of things are in our power: But practise beareth sway in habits; for custome is as it were a purchased nature. If then practise rule the habit, and if practise bee in our power, then the habit also must be in our power: yea, and the actions also, whose habits are in our power, (and which are effected according to those habits) must bee in our power also; because the actions are conformable to the habits.
Hee then which hath the habit of justice, will do just things; and hee that hath a habit of injurie, will doe injurious things. Therefore God hath given us a power to bee just or unjust.
Our counselling also, and our exhorting of one another, doe declare that there bee some things in our power; for no man doth exhort us not to bee hungry, or not to thirst, or to flye in the ayre; because these things are not in our power. Therefore it is manifest, that those things whereunto our exhortations doe serve, are in our power.
Moreover, if nothing be in our power, then our lawes are superfluous; but every nation useth some lawes naturally, as knowing, that they have power to doe such things as their lawes injoyne: And many nations have ascribed the making of their lawes to the gods (as the inhabitants of Crete, to Iupiter; and the Lacedemonians to Apollo) therefore the knowledge that such things are in our power is naturally dispersed amōg all men.
The like may be inferred upon the praises, or dispraises which follow those things of which wee make choice of; and of all those other circumstances (aforementioned) which disprove that all things are done by destiny.