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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of the cause why man was made with free will; and that if it had been otherwise, he…
Somewhat remaines to be declared, wherby it may bee manifest why man had freewill bestowed upon him.
We affirme, that immediately, together with reason this freewill entered into us; and that together with nature, there is ingraffed into created things a mutability, and alteration; especially in those things which are a subject made of matter. For there is a mutation even in the very beginning of every thing which is made; and all making proceedeth from an alteration of the materiall subject.
This is evident to any man who considerately beholds the plants, and living-creatures, which have their abiding either in the earth, in the water, or in the aire: For there is in all those a continuall mutability.
Moreover, that our freewill enters into us, together with reason, hath beene made plain enough by those things which we have said, to prove that some thing is in our power; as will appeare to them who have heeded what was delivered to that purpose. But because the sequell of this treatise, doth for some respects require the same; perhaps it will not be impertinent to repeat some part of that which was formerly declared.
Our reason is divided into contemplation, and practise Contemplative reason, is that which concerneth (universally) the nature of things, as they bee really; and active reason, is that whereby wee deliberate of things, and sets downe the right way of putting them into execution.
The contemplative part is called the minde (or the principall part of the soule) and the active part is termed reason. The one is likewise called wisdome, and the other prudence.
Now every one that deliberates, doth for this cause deliberate, even for that the choice of such things as are to be done, is in his power; and to the intent that hee might by deliberation, make choice of that which is most worthy; and that after he hath so chosen, he might execute the same.
It is therefore necessary, that he which deliberates should have power over his owne deeds: for if he have not power over his owne actions; his consultation will be fruitlesse also unto him. And if these things be so; it will follow, by a necessary consequence, that wheresoever reason is planted, there is likewise freewill. For either he is no reasonable-creature; or else, if he be a reasonable-creature, he hath power over the beginnings of his owne actions; and in having that power, hath also freewill.
It hath beene declared IIalso, that things composed of a materiall subject, have a mutability in them; out of which (together with what hath been said before) it may bee inferred, that there must, of necessity, be in man both freewill, and mutability. Mutability, because hee is made of matter; and freewill, because he is indued with reason.
Whosoever therefore findes fault with God, for that hee did not so make man at the first, that hee might not fall unto vice, but gave him his owne choice: Surely, those men are not aware, that they reprove GOD for making man reasonable, and not rather an unreasonable-creature.
For one of these two is unavoidably necessary. Either man should have beene made void of reason; or else being indued with reason, and exercised in action, hee must have in him freewill. Yea, and thereupon it followes also of necessity, that every nature endued with reason, hath freewill, and is mutable of his owne nature.
But those natures have especially a mutability in them which are made of a materiall subject; aswell in respect that they were made, as in regard they were made of matter: whereas those natures which were not made of matter (as the subject) have mutability in them, but in one respect onely; namely, in that they were made.
Moreover, so many of those immateriall natures as were conversant in earthly matters, and intermedled with such inferiour things, as are to bee done, by reason of communicating with men; by so much they became more mutable then others (of that immateriall nature) And so many of them as directed the excellency of their nature, to approach neare unto God, with an inclination to love him; and to enjoy a blessed estate in the minding and fruition of him; so bending themselves inward, and unto GOD only, that they wholly estranged themselves from outward, and materiall things. Those (by that meanes) became so familiar with contemplation, and with GOD, that they still remaine without mutation. Having a freewill, in that they are indued with reason; and yet are not now subject unto alteration, for the forementioned causes.
And this need not bee wondred at. For even those men also, which give themselves to contemplation, and sequester themselves from the inordinate love, and medling in worldly affaires, doe and may attaine unto an immutable condition, (and unto an estate of grace, from which there is no falling away.)
Now I doe suppose, that this (with what was formerly said) hath sufficiently proved, that in the beginning, all the reasonable creatures were created in so excellent a condition, that if they had remained such as they were made, they should have beene void of all vice, and that their vitiousnesse (who have been corrupted) came unto them by their owne will. For it so falleth out, that they who remaine in the condition wherein they were placed by their creation, are setled in a most blessed estate.
Of incorporeall natures, Angels alone have beene altered: yet not all of them: but some part; even so many onely, as creeping downeward departed from that inclination which they had to supreame things, and the contemplation of GOD.
It is made plaine by the things afore proved, that the powers of our will are mutable; because we are of a mutable nature: And yet no man can blame GOD, as if hee were the cause that we are evill, in regard the faculties are mutable, which he gave unto us.
For vices consist not in our faculties but in habits; and our habits depend upon our will and it is therefore the fault of our will, that we are evill, and not (originally) of our nature. But our meaning shall be more plainly understood by this that followes.
Wee have said hereto fore, that a faculty is a power whereby we are able to put in execution whatsoever we doe. And in all the faculties belonging to our choice, the self-same concerneth both the contraries (as for example) there is the same faculty of lying, and of speaking truth; one and the same faculty of temperance, and wantonnesse.
But it cannot bee, that in contrary things there should be the same habit; as in wantonnesse and temperance; or in lying, and speaking truth; because of contrary things, the habits are contrary. For the habit which concernes temperance, belongeth to vertue: but all intemperance is of vice; and therefore the vices doe not depend upon the faculties, which are in us; but upon our habits, and our will: And it is not a faculty, which maketh us wantons, or lyars, but our will. For if we would, we might speak the truth, and not lye.
Seeing then, vice is not a faculty, but a habit; God is not cause of our naughtinesse, which giveth us the faculty; but a habit (is cause thereof) which being in us, proceedeth from our selves, and by our selves, & for our selves. For if wee would endeavour thereafter, we might instead of an evill-habit, attaine unto the contrary thereof.
Now a faculty doth herein differ from a habit; all faculties are naturall, but habits are procured by use. Yea; and here also they differ; our faculties are in us without teaching, and our habits are gotten by learning, and custome. If therefore the faculties that are in us, be naturall, and without teaching; and the habits gotten by use and learning; then it cannot be that our (originall) nature should be the cause our wickednesse; but rather our evill education, whereby wee have gotten an evill habit.
For that our habits come unto us by custome, it hath beene already declared; and that our faculties are in us by nature, it is evident by this; that all men have the same faculties (except those which are someway maimed or lame.) And that the habits are not naturall, is as evident by this, that all have not the same habits; but some of them habits of one sort, and some of another: whereas things that are naturall, are found in all.