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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of the phantasie, or imagination; what it is; by what Names expressed; and by what…
Expresse we will in the next place, such things as concerne the phantasie or imagination. The faculty of imagining, is a power of that part of the soule which is void of Reason, and worketh by those instruments wherein the senses are placed.
The thing subject to imagination, is that whereabout our imagination is conversant, and may bee called imaginable, as that which is felt is termed sensible.
Imagination it selfe (called 〈…〉) is a passion of that part of the soul which is irrationall, procured by something which is subject to our imagination. A vaine imagination (called 〈…〉) is a void passion in the parts of the soule which are destitute of reason, being procured of no certaine thing whereof an imagination should arise.
But, the Stoick Philosophers doe set downe those foure in this maner; The imagination it selfe, 〈…〉; The thing wherby the imagination is moved, 〈…〉; A voide drawing away of our imagination, 〈…〉; And that which moveth our imagination to bee vainely drawne away, 〈…〉.
Imagination is a passion representing unto us both it selfe, and the thing moving our Imagination; For, when we see some white thing, there is ingendred some passion in the Soule by the reception thereof. Even as there is some passion begotten in the seats of the Sense when it feeleth any thing; So, there is then something engendred in the Soule when it conceiveth any thing; & it receiveth an Image or impression of the thing understood.
The fancie or the thing wherby Imaginatiō is moved, is, any sensible-thing, which hath caused the Imagination; as it may bee some white thing, or any other object which may move the SOVL.
The Fantastick or void drawing away of our Imagination, is a needles (or causuall) seducing (or distracting) of the Imagination, without any certaine thing which may move the same.
The Fantasme or thing it selfe, whereby wee are idely drawne away, is the very attraction whereby wee are attracted, according to our vain Imagination; which falleth out in those that are Mad or Melancholy. Betweene these Opinions there is no difference, but only, in the alteration of some Names.
The Instruments of the Imagination, are the former Panns of the braine; The Vitall spirits, which are in them; The sinewes proceeding from the braine; The nerves moistned by the Vitall spirits, and the very frame of the places, wherein the Senses are seated.
There are five seats for IIthe senses; but all are properly but one sense, which is the SOUL it self, who, by the seats of the senses, discernes all such things as fall out in them. It discernes, or taketh knowledge of an Earthy nature. by that sense, which is most Earthie and Bodily, namely the Touching: It perceiveth perspicuous (or bright shining things) by that sense which is most perspicuous, that is to say, the sight: It judgeth such things as are pertinent to aire by that seat which is ordained for the aire; for the very substance of the voice is aire, or the smiting of the aire: and it receiveth every tast by a certaine quality of the instrument of the sense of tasting; which attracts, by its waterish and spongy nature.
For it is the nature of every sensible thing, to be discerned by some thing which hath a nature like unto it: and by this reason it should seeme that there being onely foure Elements there should bee no more but foure senses.
But, because there is a kinde of vapour, and certaine smells which have a middle-nature betweene aire and water; the parts whereof are somewhat thicker then aire, & thinner then water (which appeares by them who are sick of a heavinesse in the head, by rhumes, and stoppings; for they drawing the aire by respiration, have no feeling of the vapour, by reason the fatnesse of the odour is hindered by obstructions, from approaching the sense) therefore, a fifth-seat of the sense, namely, smelling, was provided by nature, that no such thing as may bee brought unto our knowledge, should be hidden from the sense.
Yet the sense is not an alteration, but the discerning of alterations: Indeed the seats of the sense are altered, and the sense discernes this alteration.
IIINow, many times the name of the sense, and of the seats of the sense are confounded. But, sense is an apprehending of those things which are subject to sense: Yet this seemeth not to bee the definition of sense it selfe, but of the workings of the sense; And therefore some define it thus:
Sense is a certaine intellectual spirit extended from the principall part of the minde, unto the bodily instruments. It is thus also defined: Sense is a power of the soule, which taketh hold of sensible things; and the seat of the sense, is the instrument whereby it layeth hold on such things as are sensible.
Plato sayes thus; Sense is that wherein the Soule and the body communicate together concerning outward things: For, the very power it selfe belongs unto the soule; but, the instrument pertaines to the body; and both together take hold of such outward things as may bee offered to imagination.
Some things in the soul were ordained to serve and be commanded; othersome to rule and bear sway. The part which hath in it understanding, and knowledge, was ordained to rule. Those which appertaine to sense, and to the motions by appetite, as also, our ability of speaking, are made to serve and bee at command: For, our voice, and our motion by appetite, are obedient to reason, most speedily, and almost in a momēt of time.
For, wee Will and are moved together, and at once; so that we need no time to come betweene our Will and our motion, as we may see in the moving of our fingers. Some naturall things are placed under the command of Reason, as those which wee call perturbations.