Library › Nemesius of Emesa › On the Nature of Man
On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of such things as are in our choice, and what difference there is betwixt them, and…
OF our Choice, the question may perhaps bee asked whether it be not all one with that which wee call voluntary; because every thing done by choice is voluntary. To which we answer, It is not so; for they are not termini convertibiles, which they should be, if a thing done by our choice, and a thing voluntary were all one.
The thing that is voluntary, is larger then that which is by choice; for all choice is voluntary; but every thing that is voluntary, is not done by choice; as appeares in children, and in unreasonable-creatures, who doe many things voluntarily, but not by choice.
Though our friend commeth upon us unexpectedly, and so well contenteth us with his comming, that we are glad of it, yet we cannot say that it came to passe by our choice: and though hee that casually findes treasure, did willingly enough hit upon it, because it was a profitable booty; yet he did not deliberately think upon such a thing before, therefore it may be from these things concluded, that a thing voluntary, and our choice is not all one.
IINeither is our appetite and our choice all one. For our appetite is divided into these three, desire, anger, and will. Now, that our choice is neither anger, nor the desire of a thing, it is made evident by this, that man doth therein not agree with irrationall-creatures; whereas he doth agree with beasts in coveting, and in anger: And if in these last mentioned he agree with beasts, and differs from them in having a choice of things; then it is manifest, that our choice is one thing, and that our desire and our anger are other distinct things.
The same is proved by incontinent men, who are overcome by their lust, and prosecute the same contrary to their owne choice and judgements; For even the incontinent mans judgement disliketh his lust (& maketh choice of better things) whereas if his choice and appetite were all one, neither of them would bee contrary unto the other.
That choice and will are not all one, may bee proved by this; that our Will doth not agree unto all things, whereunto our choice (or judgement) doth assent. For we have a will to be in health, or to be rich; but to be in health, or to bee rich is not in our choice.
Our will hath place even in things impossible; but our choice cōsisteth in those only wch are in our power. We may say that we would be immortall, but we cannot say, that to bee immortall is at our choice. For our will extendeth unto the end it selfe; but our choice can reach no further then to the means which are in possibility to attaine that end: and there is betweene them the same proportion which there is betweene the thing subject unto our will, and that thing wherabout we enter into consultation; for the subject of our will is the end of that which wee would have, and our consultation, is about the meanes, whereby wee may accomplish that end.
Wee chuse those things onely which may be effected by us; but our will extendeth unto such things as are not in our power to accomplish; as when would that such or such a Commander should obtain the victory.
It is then well enough proved that our choice is neither the concupiscible, nor the irascible appetite, nor our will; and aswell by the same arguments, as by other also, it may bee made manifest; that it is not opinion. For opinion extendeth not onely to things which are in our power, but to things eternall.
Moreover, we say that an opinion is either true or false; but to say our choice is either true or false, is an absurd saying.
Opinion concerneth likewise universall things; but our choice is conversant in particulars: For, our choice is of things to be undergone, (enjoyed or done) which are particular things.
Neither is our choice all one with our consultation: For consultation is an advising about such things as are to be done (suffered or enjoyed) and that thing is to bee chosen which in consultation is preferred: yea, our consultation debates of things yet in question, whereas our choice reacheth to that which is already concluded most worthy.
Wee have hitherto declared IIIwhat this choice is not; and we will now shew you what it is.
Doubtlesse choice is a thing mixt of consultation, judgement, and appetite; being neither the one nor the other, but a certaine compound of these. For as wee say that a living-creature, is a compound of soul and body; and neither a body by it selfe, nor a soule alone; but a thing made up of both together; even so say wee also of this our choice.
It is plaine by the very Etymologie therof, that it is a certaine counselling, or consultation, with an approbation of some one thing before the rest; and that it is not altogether the same with consultation: For we are then onely accounted to have made choice, when one thing is taken before another. And no man preferreth any thing in choice, before he hath consulted, neither accepteth before hee hath judged.
And seeing we are not willing to execute or admit of all these things, which wee well approve of; then that which is preferred after consultation, is in choice; and contained under our choice, when it taketh an appetite thereunto. Hereupon it necessarily followes also, that our choice is conversant in the same thing about which our consultation is imployed.
Out of all which it may be concluded, that our Choice is an appetite, consulting of such things as are in our power; or a Consultation with an appetite unto those things which are in our power. For, when wee chuse, we desire that which was preferred, after our consultation.
But seeing wee have said that choice and consultation, are conversant about the self-same things; we will declare next, what it is, about which this consultation is occupied; and about what things wee consult.