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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
34. I. Of consultation, and wherein it differs from a question.
Keeping close unto our chiefe purpose, wee thinke it best (before we declare about what things wee consult) to determine wherein a consultation differs from a question. For a consultation and a question is not all one; though he that consults calls things into question by his consultation; but they differ very much. For wee seeke and aske, whether or no the Sunne be greater than the earth: but no man saith I consult whether the Sun bee greater than the Earth.
A question is more generall, and as it were genus to consultation; and the nature of it extends further; For, every consultation is a kinde of questioning; but every question is not a consultation, as hath been formerly declared.
Our consideration is conversant sometime in consultation; as when I consider whether I should goe to Sea, or not: and sometime it is conversant in debating things in the mind: as when I consider the liberall sciences; for it is not proper to say wee consult of the Sciences. But the use of these words without distinction, hath made many to 〈••〉re, and to conceive tho〈•〉 things to bee the same, which are very different. Which difference being now discovered, wee will proceed to declare what the things are whereof we consult.
We consult then of those things which are in our power; even of such as may bee brought to passe by us; and whose event is not manifest: That is, such as may fall out divers wayes.
We define it to bee of those things which are in our power, because our consultation is onely of those things which are to be undertakē by us; which things are in our power: For we doe not consult of that kinde of Philosophy, which is called contemplative; neither of GOD; nor of things which fall out of necessity (by necessity I meane those things which fall out alwayes after one maner, as the Circuit of the yeare.)
Neither doe we consult of those things which are not alwayes permanent, and yet fall out to bee alwayes alike, as of the rising and setting of the Sunne. Neither of those things which fall out naturally; yet not alwayes alike, but so for the most part onely; as; that a man of sixty should have gray haires; or that a man of twenty should begin to have a beard.
Neither consult wee of those things which chance naturally, but sometimes thus, and sometimes otherwaies, and not after any certaine time or measure; as of showers, and droughts, and haile: Neither is consultation of those things which doe fall out by chance, and seldome, one while more, and another while lesse: For in respect of these things, this clause was added, that the thing (consulted of) should be in our power.
The definition saith further, that it must bee of things which may be done by VS. Because we doe not consult of all men; neither of every thing, but of those which are in our power to consult of: For we consult not how the common wealth of our enemies may be governed; nor of them who dwell very far from us, (albeit this bee a thing which may be consulted of among themselves.)
Neither doe we consult of all things that may bee done by us; nor of all things that are in our power. And therfore these words, which have an uncertain end were added to the definition: for if the thing bee manifest, and confessed, we deliberate no more thereof.
Neither is there any consultation of such works or actions as are according to Science, and Art: For, all their principles are determinately knowne, except a few Arts which are termed conjecturall, as Physick, and the art of Exorcising, and of governing.
For, we doe not onely consult of these things; but of such also as are under our hand, and may be executed by us; they having such an uncertaine end, that the successe may be as well that, as this.
But it hath been declared that our consultation is not of the end; but of things which tend unto the end: For our consultation is not of being rich, but of the meanes how to be rich.
To speake all in briefe; IIIwee doe consult of those things onely which are doubtfull, and may be either so, or not so: and of those things we must also treate, that in our discourse nothing be wāting which may make things evident.
Those qualities are called faculties, whereby we are enabled to the performance of any thing. For, whatsoever we doe, wee have the faculty of it; and those things wee cannot performe, whereof the faculty is not in us. Therefore our action dependeth upon our faculty, and our faculty upon our essence: yea the action proceedeth from our faculty, and our faculty from our substance, and is in our substance And as I said before, these are three things depending one upon another. The thing able; the faculty by which it hath ability; and the thing which is to be done.
The thing able to doe it is a substance. The faculty is that whereby wee have ability to doe it. The thing to be done, is that, whose nature may be practised upon, by our faculty.
Of things that may bee done, some are necessary, & some contingent. Those are termed necessary which cannot possibly be hindered; or those, the contrary whereof is unpossible: And that is contingent, which may bee hindered, or whose contrary may possibly fall out.
For example; It is necessary that a man should breath as long as hee liveth; for it is impossible a man should live and not breath. It is contingent that there should be raine to day; for it is possible that this day it should not raine, which is contrary to the other.
Againe, things contingent are said to fall out sometimes often, sometime seldome, and sometimes indifferently, in this maner or in that. They are frequent, as to have gray haires at three score; they are seldome, as not to have gray haires at that age: And they are indifferent; as it is equally in our choice to walke, or not to walke; or simply to doe any act, or not to doe it.
Now our consultation is of those things onely which may indifferently come to passe, or not come to passe; and a thing is said to fall out equally or indifferently, when wee may in like sort, doe as well the contrary thereof as the thing it selfe: For, if we could not doe both equally, wee should not consult thereof. Because no man consults either of things confessed, or impossible. For if wee were able to doe but one of those things which are contrary; that should be received without ambiguity; and the contrary should not, because impossible.